Talal
Abu-Ghazaleh
Figures speak
for themselves and they don’t lie. Regardless of the attempts to downplay or
exaggerate, the rising numbers revealed by the US regarding the cost of
confrontation with Iran reflect not only the enormous military expenditure
involved, but also the seriousness of the dilemma facing the US.
The US
Department of Defense has recently reported that direct losses surged to $29
billion in a relatively short period, compared to estimates of at around $25
billion just two weeks earlier. This matter goes beyond updated calculations or
technical discrepancies reflected in the additional $4 billion compared to
estimates released at the end of last month. This is an indication that the war,
which President Trump initially described as a short excursion lasting only a
few weeks, has turned into the beginning of an escalating and prolonged
conflict whose consequences remain unclear.
What has
already become evident, however, is that the war is far less controllable than
the White House has promoted. In politics, as in economics, the most perilous
moment is not at the outbreak of war, but when major powers come to recognize
that their ability to sustain its costs has significantly diminished.
Accordingly,
the most important figure is not the tens of billions disclosed by the
Pentagon, but the estimates suggesting that the overall cost to the American
economy could surpass one trillion dollars. Such impact extends well beyond
military expenditures alone and threatens to inflict sustained pressure on
military inventories, fiscal stability, energy markets, supply chains, and the
broader American public sentiment, especially following President Trump’s remarks
about the future of the war, which fueled sharp domestic controversy.
The US, which for
a long time based much of its global standing on the idea of overwhelming and
absolute deterrence and decisive military supremacy, is now facing a different
strategic equation. Military power may initiate conflicts, but it is no longer
capable on its own to contain their economic and political consequences. This
is precisely what the prolonged experiences from Iraq and Afghanistan to the
war with Iran have revealed.
There is
another aspect to the American estimates that is worth noting. They are not
limited only to the cost of munitions, operating aircraft carriers, or
repairing military installations. Rather, they include the cost of long-term attrition.
Replacing advanced weapons systems has become more expensive and complex,
rebuilding military arsenals requires years, while medical care for soldiers as
well as the reconstruction of facilities become indefinite financial burdens
that do not end when military operations cease.
The most evident point is that this
war comes at a sensitive economic moment within the United States itself, where
markets appear increasingly unable to absorb further shocks in energy prices
and inflation. In this context, war becomes a local issue as well. This can be
seen in public opinion polls showing that 75% of Americans believe the Iran war
has made their lives worse.
This indicates
that Iran is not the only party testing the limits of American patience.
Rather, the American economy itself seems to be entering a new phase of constraints
and tension concerning its ability to finance open-ended conflicts in a rapidly
changing world, where the traditional ability to shift costs primarily onto
others is steadily declining.
Another
important point is that Washington, which for decades managed wars as a tool for
reshaping international balances, is now confronting a different reality. The
world that once absorbed the repercussions of American power with ease is no
longer the same. Markets have become more fragile, the global economy is more
interconnected, and Western societies themselves have become more sensitive to
the human and financial costs of long-running conflicts.
The new fiscal
directions in Washington can also be viewed as a direct reflection of this
expanding military logic. According to the outlines of the budget proposal
submitted to Congress, the United States is moving toward unprecedented levels
of defense spending while simultaneously reducing non-defense expenditures. This
shift marks a clear reordering of state priorities in favor of the military, at
the expense of other social and economic dimensions.
In this
context, the most important issue is that this increase follows prior
accumulations that raised military expenditures and pushed US defense spending
to the trillion-dollar brink for the first time. This once again raises the
question about the relationship between foreign wars and the ability of the US domestic
economy to continue financing them.